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E PLURIBUS UNUM?1
Dr. Steven Alan SAMSON'
In the mid-nineteenth century, a German immigrant who launched the first American encyclopedia
and who called himself a "publicist," laid the groundwork for a systematic political science. Francis
Lieber wrote treatises on political ethics, political and legal hermeneutics, political economy, and
the sources of civil liberty. He is best remembered for his codification of the rules of warfare that
laid the foundation of the later Hague and Geneva Conventions.
Lieber introduced the concept of the nation-state into the English language, one of many
Lieberisms we still use. But he also contrasted the national polity - that is, one nation for all - with
what he called "centralism."
Centralism may be intensely national, even to bigotry; it may become a political fanaticism
[meaning an ideology like communism or Rousseauism]; it may be intelligent and formulated
with great precision [such as the regime of Louis Napoleon]; but centralism remains an inferior
species of government. .. [D]ecentralization [by which Lieber explicitly meant "interdependence"]
becomes necessary as self-government or liberty are longed for. ..
Lieber went on to outline how England - "with unbarred national intercommunication': developed as a national polity long before the rest of Europe did and noted how England remained
the least centralized state. Lieber's historical treatment of this matter may be instructive here as
a reminder that "those large communities, which we call nations, formed on the continent of Europe
out of the fragmentary people left by the disintegration of the Roman empire." Each was an
amalgam of many. Can that be accomplished today without "ethnic cleansing?"
Lieber's account of the circumstances that preceded the long and very slow emergence
of nation-states appears to be a fair description as well of the more recent ebbing tide of dynastic
and colonial empires. Some of the legacies of these dead empires, though not nearly enough of
them, have begun to stabilize; some, like Singapore, even thrive. Too many have not. But Lieber
was not pessimistic, even though he foresaw the challenge of totalitarianism, a form of centralism he
styled "democratic despotism," noting that in the Second Empire "the advance of knowledge and
intelligence gives to despotism brilliancy, and the necessity of peace for exchange give it a facility to
establish itself which it never possessed before." Is this perhaps descriptive of the future of China?
In his 1868 essay on "Nationalism and Internationalism," Lieber summarized "the three main
principles which mark the modern epoch."
The national polity
The general endeavor to define more clearly, and to extend more widely, human rights
and civil liberty, and the decree which has gone forth that many leading nations shall flourish at
one and the same time, plainly distinguished from one another, yet striving together, with one public
opinion, under the protection of one law of nations, and in the bonds of one common moving civilization.
Indeed, he believed "the multiplicity of civilized nations, their distinct independence (without
which there would be enslaving Universal Monarchy), and their increasing resemblance and
agreement, are some of the great safeguards of our civilization." This suggests Aristotle's mixed
regime on a large scale.
While Lieber's description may sound naNe in light of some of the tragedies of the
century that followed, his characterization of the principles of the Anglo-American tradition "of
civil liberty and self-government," especially in his book of that title, merits careful review and application.
A good summary of this tradition may be found in the Principles of the Portland Declaration of
1981 set down by Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, who noted in point twelve that "the state has an
'annexationist' character tending toward centralization and the development of a Provider State.
We must uphold the principle of subsidiarity" [that is, a plurality of autonomous governing institLrtions] .
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Here let us look at another writer in the Burkean tradition who suggests how the seeds of
what Lieber called "institutional liberty" may be planted, nurtured, and protected. Roger Scruton
has devoted much of his work - academic, political, and entrepreneurial- to this enterprise. In The
West and the Rest, Scruton focuses on the profound differences that separate what he calls the
"personal state" based on Roman law (i.e., the West) from the essentially private space so many
others inhabit without the protection of mediating institutions. Commenting on the motivation for
the 9-11 attacks, Scruton identified the attacks' principal target in terms that Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau would have well understood:
[It] is neither Western civilization, nor Christianity, nor global capitalism, nor anything else
that can be given an abstract profile ... In an uncanny way, the Islamists have identified the core
component of the system that they wish to destroy. It is not the American people who are the
enemy. It is the American state, conceived as an autonomous agent acting freely on the stage of
international politics, and so calling on itself the wrath of God. When Khomeini described America as
"the Great Satan" he meant it literally. And his doing so showed that he grasped the fundamental
difference between the West and the rest: namely, that in the West, but not in the rest, there is a
political process generating corporate agency, collective responsibility, and moral personality in
the state ...
A nation-state ... is a moral and legal person, which acts on its own behalf and is liable for
what it does. The nation-state can therefore be praised and blamed, hated and loved, and the form of
membership that it offers is also a bond of trust between individual citizens and the corporation
in whose decision-making they share.
Scruton refers to it as "the personal State" Citizens are joint members of a political corporation
who enjoy limited liability protections and are thius freed and even encouraged to become entrepreneurs.
The difference between the citizen of a personal state and the resident of a legal fiction
like Iraq, or Somalia, or so North Korea calls to mind the ancient Athenian distinction between
the citizen as the creature of the city-state and the essentially private individual, who is left naked
to his enemies. As Pericles put it in the Funeral Oration, the Athenian who takes no interest in
politics is not a man who minds his own business - "we say that he has no business here at all."
Scruton observes that citizens of personal states are clothed in their rights, they consent
to being governed rather than ruled, they enjoy the protections of a system based on the rule of
law. These are some of the ingredients of a potent and highly productive mixture but they require
institutional safeguards:
In the absence of corporate personality, experiments in democratic government lead to
social disruption, factionalism, and either the tyranny of the majority or the seizure of power by a clique ...
Without the framework of institutions and the underlying territorial loyalty, democratization is merely a
staging post on the way to tyranny.
Indeed, without them we have the Hobbesian "state of nature." The instability of much of
the developing world generally calls mind, often brutally, the J-curve theory of political violence.
As summarized by James C. Davies:
The crucial factor [that predicts violence] is the vague or specific fear that ground gained
over a long period of time will be quickly lost. This fear does not generate if there is continued
opportunity to satisfy continually emerging needs; it generates when the existing government
suppresses or is blamed for suppressing such opportunity.
How to change that perception or that reality - the absence of the rule of law - is an issue
that demands attention.
In his essay on "The Need for Nations" Scruton issues a challenge to both the West and
the rest of the world:
Never in the history of the world have there been so many migrants. And almost all of them
are migrating from regions where nationality is weak or non-existent to the established nation
states of the West... [F]ew of them identify their loyalties in national terms and almost none of
them in terms of the nations where they settle. They are migrating in search of citizenship which is the principle gift of national jurisdictions, and the origin of the peace, law, stability, and
prosperity that still prevail in the West.
Citizenship is the relation that arises between the State and the individual when each is
fully accountable to the other. It consists in a web of reciprocal rights and duties, upheld by a rule
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of law which stands higher than either party. Although the State enforces that law, it enforces it
equally against itself and against the private citizen. The citizen has rights which the State is
duty-bound to uphold, and also duties which the State has a right to enforce.
Roger Scruton's final sentence here both echoes and refutes Roger Taney's defective
understanding of the Constitution expressed in the Dred Scott case. The Civil Rights movement
sought to repair a misrepresentation that had been long embedded in the national culture, one of
the many varieties of what Frederic Bastiat called "legal plunder:" that is, the use of the law to
"sanctify injustice," making lawful what is commonly regarded as "corruption." Too often it is the
absence of institutional liberty and the unchecked flourishing of legal plunder that account for the
struggles, conflicts, and migrations that trouble the whole world. To illustrate: Hernando de Soto
and his associates conducted a revealing study the legal and other obstacles to setting up a
business enterprise in a number of developing countries.
Scruton's point about the plight of migrants has present applications to the ongoing immigration
debate here but it also rings with ancient controversies - recorded in the Bible, The Oresteia, the
Melian debate - over the mistreatment, indeed the scapegoating of strangers, dissenters, and
others who are different. Rene Girard has provided much insight into such behavior through his
ideas about mimetic rivalry.
Concerning these migrants, including those who riot in the suburbs of Paris, people may
object to Scruton's analysis by saying that, no, they are seeking opportunity, gainful employment,a
means to stave off hunger or to escape turmoil. I imagine he would reply that these are only the'
particulars, the incidentals of the larger problem. What the migrants and their neighbors lack
where they reside is the kind of life that is made possible through an institutional liberty nurtured
within a territorial state that protects their property, that enables them to capitalize their assets
and enjoy the fruits of citizenship in a thriving community. What they need, desire, and demand
then is to have a home where their heart resides. Yet this is exactly what the West too often
takes for granted:
Every citizen becomes linked to every other, by relations that are financial, legal, and fiduciary,
but which presuppose no personal tie. A society of citizens can be a society of strangers, all enjoying
sovereignty over their own lives, and pursuing their individual goals and satisfactions. They are
societies in which you form common cause with strangers, and which all of you, in those matters
on which your common destiny depends, can with conviction say 'we.'
The nation-state - as opposed to its rivals - offers an opportunity to reconcile the old dilemma
of unity vs. diversity. This interplay of individuals, this synergy of forces, this weaving of one fabric out
of many threads, has given the West its vitality and cohesion. The prevailing American notion of
the nation-state is inclusive. All generations, kindred [gentes], and genders are welcome to contribute.
No one is excluded. As David Landes puts it: "Literate mothers matter." But Pierre Manent warns
that the West risks forfeiting its advantage through the erosion of its political forms, institutions,
and families through globalization and democratization:
Commerce [binding individuals rather than citizens], right [allowing judges to rule directly
in the name of humanity], morality [detached from its social framework]: these are the three systems,
the three empires that promise to exit from the political.
In other words, political discussion yields priority to managerial techniques - rule by administrative
mandarins who are not accountable to the political process.
Each in its own form: commerce, according to the realism, the prosaic character of interests
rightly understood; right, according to the intellectual coherence of a network of rights rigorously
deduced from individual autonomy; and finally, morality, according to the sublime aim of pure
human dignity to which one is joined by the purely spiritual sentiment of respect.
Liberty, commerce, rights, and morality have thus become detached from their roots in
Biblical ethics. Roger Scruton similarly characterizes this highly individualistic and irresponsible
"morality" as a "culture of repudiation." Often it is the elite classes that repudiate the common
core of values. This will only make the assimilation of migrants more complicated. For Kenneth Minogue,
any "exit from the political" in the form of an abstract and poorly delimited "political moralism" is an
entrance into the despotic. Let us hope instead that Africa, Asia, and Latin America can develop
Lieber's "multiplicity of civilized nations" even as so many Europeans strive to repudiate theirs.
For Francis Lieber one of the two distinct facts that distinguish modern civilization from
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antiquity is "the recuperative energy of modern states." Today it is evident that this statement must be
qualified. Modern civilization can recover only to the degree that it can tap into the fiduciary reservoir
of power: the consent of the governed. Personal states must somehow work together and address
the issues of the day, binding people together while preserving their rich diversity, or global
institutions will continue to fail to work as originally envisioned.
As Edmund Burke noted: "Society is indeed a contract ... it becomes a partnership not
only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and
those who are to be born." Here let us conclude with an observation by the great French poet
and essayist, Paul Valery:
Power has only the force we are willing to attribute to it; even the most brutal power is
founded on belief. We credit it with the ability to act at all times and everywhere, whereas, in reality, it
can only act at one point and at a certain moment. In short, all power is exactly in the position of
a bank whose existence depends on the sole probability (incidentally, very great) that all its clients will
not come at once to draw out their deposits. If, either constantly or at any particular moment, a
certain power were summoned to bear its real force at every point in its empire, its strength at
each point would be about equal to zero ...
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